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1. Introduction 
 
The way speakers and nations use language reflects the power relationships of a 
society. Languages are inherently dynamic, interactive, and multi-layered. Nation-
states are stabilizing and isolating to preserve territorial integrity. Multilingual nation-
states seek to preserve territorial boundaries in part by delimiting hierarchical 
boundaries between their languages.  
 
Mandarin, canonized as the standard language, stands at the pinnacle of a 
metalinguistic hierarchy which mirrors the vertical basis of power in China today. 
State language policies establish official minority languages (and Chinese “dialects”) 
under the arching umbrella of the Chinese state; yet their domain, or horizontal 
scope, is strictly constrained through prescriptive standardization. The dynamic 
change and variation of spoken languages is reduced to a single text.  
 
This paper explores the tension between this codifying imperative of the Chinese 
state and the dynamic force of speakers. I survey Chinese language policy in theory 
and practice, then focus on the expressions of power through language use. 
 
 
2. Language policy in China: theory and practice 
 
According to the Chinese Constitution, all 56 minzu (“nationalities”) are equal and 
enjoy equal status “in the Zhonghua Minzu Chinese Nation”.1 “Official policy 
condemns both ‘Han Chauvinism’, the belief that the Han, or Chinese, are superior 
to other groups, and ‘Local Nationality Chauvinism’, which denies that groups other 
than the Han are integral parts of the Chinese nation.” 2 But in practice, only non-
Han speakers are referred to as minzu. Even though the Hans are one of the 56 
official minzu, there are no Chinese research departments and no Han students at the 
                                                 
1 Stevan Harrell, ‘Linguistics and hegemony in China’ International Journal of the Sociology of Language 103 
(1993), p. 97. 
2 Ibid.; cf. Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, ‘The Kazaks in Xinjiang’ in Benson and Svanberg 
(eds), The Kazaks of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority (Uppsala: Studia Multiethnica Upsaliensia 5, 
1988), p. 56. 
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central Minzu daxue (Minzu university) in Beijing, and there are no articles on Han 
Chinese linguistics in the national journal Minzu yuyan (Minzu Languages).  
With the stability of the P.R.C. ever paramount, the focus of Chinese language policy 
has shifted from the description and definition of languages (1949-1980’s) to the 
limited accommodation of tightly-constrained diversity.  
 
The goal of language policy of the 1950’s was to establish parameters for the extent 
of cultural and linguistic variation within the Chinese nation-state. For the first time, 
language-survey teams were dispatched to minority regions to determine the 
linguistic and cultural affiliation(s) of the groups in question. This data, together with 
social and political considerations3, was used to establish or reject minzu status for 
lesser-known groups. The languages of major groups (with large populations and 
long-standing written traditions) were accorded recognition early on. Language 
policies of the 1950’s mandated the use of “one or several of the commonly-used 
local languages and scripts”.4 This permitted Uygur, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Yi to 
achieve stature as a regional standard languages (though subordinate to Mandarin 
Chinese), and provided for the limited maintenance of all other subordinate 
languages.5 However, behind the language-maintenance rhetoric was an 
assimilationist policy in the name of the greater Chinese nation. As CASS scholar 
Dob (Daobu) describes, “in the late 1950’s, the relevant government 
department...had overstated the commonalities of the different nationalities, played 
down their differences, and propagated the idea that the assimilation of all 
nationalities and languages would soon be accomplished”.6 For the central 
government, the preservation of ethnic languages was perceived to conflict with the 
preservation of the nation itself. 
 
                                                 
3 Sun Hongkai, one of China’s most prominent linguists, acknowledges that “the desires of the 
nationality concerned” can be as important as linguistic criteria for determining minzu status. He cites 
Buyi and Zhuang, Sibe and Manchu as closely-related pairs that because of their separate minzu status 
are nonetheless considered separate languages (at least within China) (Sun Hongkai, ‘Language 
recognition and nationality’ International Journal of the Sociology of Language 97 (1992), pp.16-17).  
4 CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) Nationalities Research Institute and Chinese 
Nationalities Commission (eds), ‘Minzu wenzi gongzuo sishi nian jishi’ Zhongguo shaoshu minzu (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Zangxue Press , 1992), p. 223, emphasis added. 
5 Media, schools and educational materials are provided in demographically dominant minority 
languages, but Chinese-language broadcast air time, newspapers, and educational opportunities 
outstrip those in subordinate languages by a factor of at least 3:1. In theory, however, every language 
is deserving of such institutional support: “Each and every minority Nationality has the freedom to 
develop its own language and script, preserve or improve its traditions, customs, and religious beliefs.” 
(Item 43 of the Common Programme, first meeting of the People’s Political Consultative Conference, 
September 29, 1949, ibid., p. 219). [Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.] 
6 Dob (Daobu) White, ‘The position and role of minority languages and their writing systems in 
China’ International Journal of the Sociology of Language 97 (1992), p. 53. 
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After thirty years, beginning in 1979-1980 a more accommodationist policy was 
implemented. For those groups with orthographies and national status, minority-
language schools and presses were reopened; for many of the smaller groups, 
orthographies were devised. For all groups, distinct minority “customs” (such as 
religions, legends, and rites of passage) were again acknowledged to exist. Twenty 
years ago a Salar folklorist was jailed for publishing the legend of the Salars’ Central 
Asian origins, yet today their origins outside of China are now officially-sanctioned 
history.7 
 
By the mid-1980’s, the minority nationalities were identified and “known”: the 
language(s), history, and customs of each group had been described and codified in 
national publications. The borders of China where so many minorities live were 
similarly well-defined and well-protected. Minority language policy thus moderated 
and became more flexible with regard to local conditions. A limited linguistic 
diversity is now encouraged as long as this variation falls within the parameters 
defined by the Chinese state. Thus several mutually unintelligible varieties of 
Chinese, Tibetan, and Yi are recognized, but they are identified as dialects, not 
languages. “Bilingual” educational is available for certain minority languages from 
preschool through the university level, but a mastery of Chinese is a necessary 
condition for study at the tertiary level. As ethnolinguistic groups, the minority 
nationalities are officially on a par with the dominant Hans, but even recent 
scholarship continues to primitivize and exoticize the former. One article on the 
Zhuang, one of China’s largest minority groups, notes that the “Zhuang’s song 
festival ... provides linguistic evidence of sex worship, totemism, and the custom of 
inhabiting caves”.8 This highly limited accommodation of diversity serves to 
reinforce the definitions of ethnicity established during the 1950’s. 
 
This goal of minority-language containment is furthered by population and 
orthography policies. The population transfer and migration of Han Chinese from 
eastern China to the peripheral regions has firmly established the national standard, 
Mandarin Chinese, as the primary language of government, scholarship, and to some 
extent, commerce. In Xinjiang, for example, the Han population has increased 
almost twenty-fold since 1953.9 
 
                                                 
7 Han Zhanxiang 1992, personal communication. 
8 Zhou Qingsheng, ‘Aspects of Chinese ethnosociolinguistic studies: a report on the literature’ 
International Journal of the Sociology of Language 97 (1992), p. 67. 
9 The Han population of Xinjiang was 300,000 according to the 1953 census, 5,695,409 in 1990, and 
continues to increase steadily (Benson and Svanberg, p. 35; Xinjiang Weiwuer zizhiqu renkou jicha 
bangongshi (eds), Xinjiang Weiwuer zizhiqu 1990 nian renkou jicha ziliao (Ürümchi: China Statistical 
Publishing House, 1992), p. 297). 
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In a society which is united by a common writing system, orthographic policy is one 
of the cornerstones of language policy. One of the main rationales for referring to 
the Chinese “dialects” as part of a monolithic “Chinese language” is the existence of 
a common Chinese writing system. Minority-language writing systems are also used 
to unite speakers of divergent languages (e.g. the so-called ‘Standard Yi script’ of 
Yunnan).  
 
Orthography policy is usually designed to contain “major” languages and ensure the 
obsolescence of “minor” languages. Languages which already had scripts at the time 
of the formation of the People’s Republic were automatically accorded a measure of 
prestige for having ‘civilization’ (wenhua). These existing writing systems were 
tolerated, and in the 1950’s 14 new or revised Latin-based scripts were introduced 
for 10 minority nationalities.10 However, the purpose of such policies was to effect a 
transition from the minority language to Mandarin Chinese. Many of the languages 
with long written traditions such as Tibetan, Mongolian, Yi, and Uygur were 
encouraged to switch to Latin-based scripts modeled after pinyin (the P.R.C. 
transliteration system for Chinese), with the goal that it would facilitate their learning 
of Chinese. More subtly, each group that adopts a pinyin-based script also adopts the 
Chinese state’s way of framing language, and is thus a step closer to having been 
brought into the Chinese fold. This policy, while successful amongst many groups 
previously without orthographies, failed dismally with those minorities with previous 
written traditions. The Uygurs and Qazaqs, for example, resumed use of an Arabic-
based script within a few years. 
 
 
 3. An Unwritten Text: The structure of Languages and Power in China 
 
The implementation of these policies have in effect created a five-tiered language 
hierarchy in China: 
 
(1) THE NATIONAL STANDARD, Mandarin Chinese. 
(2) REGIONAL STANDARD LANGUAGES, including regional varieties of Mandarin 
Chinese, and regional minority standards, such as Yi, Mongolian, Tibetan, 
and Uygur. 
(3) PRIMARY MINORITY LANGUAGES, i.e. those with historical and/or modern 
prestige, usually large populations, and moderate political clout. These 
include Qazaq, Korean, Manchu, Zhuang, Naxi, and the non-standard 
Chinese dialects. 
(4) SECONDARY MINORITY (or SUB-MINORITY) LANGUAGES, which include the 
remaining low-prestige, usually unwritten languages with small numbers of 
                                                 
10 White, p. 52. 
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speakers and no clout, e.g. Evenki, Salar, Va. Often these groups have larger 
numbers of speakers elsewhere, hence their designation as Dispersed 
Nationalities by the 1950’s government. 
(5) UNRECOGNIZED LANGUAGES, usually unclassified mixed languages such as 
Wutun (Gansu) and Aynu (Xinjiang), or languages lumped in with others, 
such as Wakhi (“Tajik”, Xinjiang). 
 
In the above hierarchy, PRIMARY and SECONDARY are political (not linguistic) terms. 
A given group’s status in this hierarchy bears on the implementation of central 
government policy directives. PRIMARY MINORITIES may be accorded limited 
preferential treatment, with partial native-language schooling, print and even 
broadcast media provided, such as the Sibes. SECONDARY MINORITIES usually have 
no infrastructural support (e.g. schools) since they rarely have official orthographies. 
However, certain areas have affirmative action-type programs in place. At the Ili 
Teacher’s College in western Xinjiang, college-bound Özbek and Salar students are 
eligible for the few freshman-class slots the school reserves for them.11 
 
 
 
4. Negotiating Power through Language Policy 
 
4.1 PACKAGING THE CHINESE NATIONALITIES FROM THE CIVILIZING CENTER 
 
Language policy in China is reminiscent of much of Chomskyan linguistics: first the 
bounds of an idealized language are defined, then real-language data is found to fit 
the model. In China’s case, the model is a vertically-integrated, limited-multilingual 
state. It is very much like binding a barrel with steel bands to strengthen its capacity 
to hold water. At the center of the barrel are the Han Chinese lands and civilization; 
at its edges are the minorities. 
 
In a society which reveres the written canon, the existence of an orthography and 
body of written materials is taken as indicative of some degree of cultural 
sophistication. Conversely, national minorities without orthographies were and are 
still considered backwards. One frequently hears members of orthographied minority 
groups (as well as Hans) refer to minorities without orthographies as ‘without 
civilization’. 
 
Spoken language is fluid, and exhibits a great deal of variation among different 
speakers, locales, and time periods. In contrast, written language is fixed and 
codified. In sponsoring the creation of standard orthographies and grammars for 
                                                 
11 Shahandek 1992, personal communication. 
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languages, the Chinese state has been establishing central control over the speakers 
of these languages by the codifying and packaging of these languages.  
 
This codification is achieved by constructing a “literary” standard for grammars of 
unwritten minority languages. The Salar language spoken in Amdo Tibet, for example, 
is Turkic in origin but a mixed (Turkic, Chinese, and Tibetan) language today. Its 
vocabulary is at least 20% Chinese and 10% Tibetan.12 Morphological and syntactic 
structures have been borrowed wholesale from these latter languages. Yet linguistic 
works published in China to date treat Salar as a Turkic language with a few loan 
words; the Salar-speaking area considered “most standard” by Chinese scholars is 
also the one that most preserves Turkic features. When a Salar orthography was 
proposed in the early 1980’s, it was based on the language of that ‘most-Turkic’ area. 
This view has since gained currency among the locals, who will urge visiting linguists 
to visit that area to hear ‘real Salar’. Furthermore, Salar grammars and lexicons 
emphasize the Turkic elements in Salar, but omit most Tibetan and Chinese features. 
Works on Salar morphosyntax contain descriptions of verb tenses that modern Salar 
no longer has, or perhaps never had. Salar’s simplified grammatical paradigm, typical 
of mixed languages, is not tolerated. 
 
The mutability of languages runs counter to the codifying aims of the metalinguistic 
hierarchy of the Chinese state. Languages, like ethnic identities, are constantly in 
motion, localized, interactive, and subjective, not static and codified.  
 
 
4.2 THE LITERARY CANON 
 
Scientific research in China on languages and their speakers has operated under the 
assumption that ethnolinguistic identity is fixed, global, discrete, and objectifiable. In 
the view of Chinese academia, each of the 55 officially-recognized minority 
nationalities constitutes (and has always constituted) a bundle of immutable features: 
an ethnonym, a history, a language, a locale, and “ethnic” customs. (The Hans are 
assumed to be the default or unmarked group.) Since the research teams first went 
out to minority areas in the 1950’s, following central directives several important 
series on minority languages, histories, and literature have appeared. Most series have 
one volume per national minority. In essence, these works serve to justify and 
promote the officially-defined feature bundle for each minority group. In so doing, 
the central government is creating an imagined community (in the Andersonian 
sense) in negotiation with its minorities. These reference books put weight behind 
such definitions of language and ethnicity in China. 
 
                                                 
12 Based on the quantitative analysis of Salar texts I collected in situ, 1991-1993. 
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Of particular note is the Series of Five Minority Problems (Minzu wenti wuzhong 
congshu, or simply Wutao congshu). The individual series are as follows: 
 
(1) The Minority Nationalities of China (Zhongguo shaoshu minzu) (single volume) 
(2) Concise Histories of the Chinese Minority Nationalities (Zhongguo shaoshu minzu 
jianshi) 
(3)Concise Grammars of the Chinese Minority Nationalities (Zhongguo shaoshu minzu 
yuyan jianzhi) 
(4) Introductions to the Autonomous areas of Chinese Minority Nationalities 
(Zhongguo shaoshu minzu zizhi difang gaikuang) 
(5) Surveys of the Social History of Chinese Minority Nationalities (Zhongguo shaoshu 
minzu shehui lishi diaocha) 
 
The editors of the above book The Minority Nationalities of China13 note that while that 
particular volume was published by People’s Press in Beijing, that all the series 
volumes are “published by other presses of the central authorities as well as by 
presses in every region.” 
 
Actually, only the autonomous areal introductions and the occasional surveys are 
published locally, and the latter are especially sporadic. The Concise Histories and the 
Concise Grammars are uniformly published in Beijing by Nationalities (Minzu) Press. 
Moreover, most of the authors are senior researchers at the Nationalities Research 
Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). These linguists 
conducted research in the minority communities as outsiders (almost all are Han and 
male); from that they wrote these reference works. This constitutes a clear statement 
of centralized power.  
 
Grammars of minority languages were commissioned as an outgrowth of minority 
classification efforts in the late 1950’s. Now there exists one Concise Grammar for each 
officially-identified minority language. 
 
As of 1992, Shanghai Wenyi Press had published 40 collections of minority folktales 
covering 46 officially-recognized minorities. Volumes including the folktales of the 
remaining nine groups are planned. Yet all of these collections are Chinese 
translations. As such they have limited value as folklore and no value as language 
samples. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Zhongguo shaoshu minzu editorial group (eds), Zhongguo shaoshu minzu (Beijing: Renmin, 1981), 
p.396. 
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4.3 BEIJING AS THE SEAT OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
Authorities on Chinese minorities are overwhelmingly Hans in Beijing. If we look at 
the Concise Grammars just of the Turkic languages in China, we find that all eight 
principal authors are Han, and all are based at the prestigious Nationalities Research 
Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Science in Beijing. Seven of the eight are 
male.14 
 
As a foreign field linguist working in China, I am certainly in no position to criticize 
outsiders going into communities to record linguistic and cultural information. But 
by having almost exclusively the members of the dominant Han group author the 
standard (and in many cases, the only) work on the subject suggests that authority 
rests in the hands of the Han. That they all hail from Beijing reinforces the notion 
that the minority languages are under strict central control. Since cultural knowledge 
is bundled in language, this display of State control extends into the very heart of 
minority identities. 
 
Ethnic affiliation by no means determines the appropriate qualifications and skills of 
good fieldworkers/researchers. But if the principal investigator is an outsider, it is 
crucial that s/he collaborate intellectually with the local scholars to a significant 
degree. In this regard, the Concise Histories fare much better than the Concise Grammars: 
those about groups living in Xinjiang are almost all published in Xinjiang, and at least 
co-authored by a scholar who is a member of that group. 
 
 
4.4 BEIJING CONTROLS ALL, EVEN TIME ITSELF 
 
Officially, all of China’s vastness is one time zone. Be they in Kashgar, Lhasa or 
Kunming, China’s infrastructure operates on Beijing time. Close to the winter 
solstice, a bank employee in Kashgar (3000 kilometers from Beijing) gets to work in 
pitch black at 8:00 A.M. Beijing time, even though the sun doesn’t rise until about 11 
A.M. In Xinjiang and Tibet however, an informal local time system two hours earlier 
than Beijing time has long been in use. While Hans generally go by Beijing time, 
minorities tend to use the local time. In making dates and appointments, each 
person’s choice of a time system constitutes a public display of their acceptance or 
rejection of the hegemonic efforts of Chinese authority. 
 
                                                 
14 Data from the Concise Grammars of Uygur, Qazaq, Qïrghïz, Tatar, Özbek, Tuva, Salar, Sarïgh Yogur; 
the ethnic and professional affiliations of the authors from Junast (Zhaonasitu) and Li Hengpu (eds.), 
Dangdai Zhongguo minzu yuyanxuejia. (Xining: Qinghai renmin, 1989). The principal author of the work 
on Özbek was based in Ürümchi at the time of publication, but since 1992 has been at CASS in 
Beijing. Two grammars had native-speaker co-authors (Özbek and Tatar ). 
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This cavalier show of control over time itself characterizes the hubris of the Chinese 
state. It manifests itself not only in efforts to demonstrate control over synchronic 
time, but in quite successful attempts to manipulate historical time. Modern 
geopolitical boundaries and recently-created “Minority Nationalities” are projected 
backwards in time to serve the present Chinese state.15 Thus, western Yunnan, Inner 
Mongolia, and Xinjiang have “always been inseparable parts of China”, just as the 
Uygurs have “always” been a part of an Uygur nationality. Modern minority 
languages and literatures in particular have been pressed into service to reinforce the 
official parameters of minzu. Speakers of modern Uygur dialects are considered to be 
direct descendants of eleventh century sedentary oasis-dwelling Turkic-speakers of 
“Xinjiang”, even though there is ample historical evidence that these medieval 
Eastern Turkistani oasis dwellers spoke Indo-European and Mongolian as well as a 
variety of Turkic languages/dialects.16  
 
 
4.5 ETHNONYMS, LANGUAGE NAMES, AND THE POLITICS OF LINGUISTIC 
CLASSIFICATION 
 
Another aspect of the officially defined feature bundle that the government has 
skillfully manipulated is in nomenclature: the names of languages and their speakers. 
 
(1) THE “TAJIKS” (TAJIKE) 
 
There is a group of 26,000 Indo-Iranian speakers in the Pamirs near the Karakorum 
Highway, where Xinjiang meets Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. They are 
predominantly Wakhi (Vakh), but also Sariqoli (Sarykoli). The Chinese government, 
however, calls them all ‘Tajiks’. Linguistically, socially, and economically, though, 
these are two separate groups. From a linguistic point of view, Wakhi and Sariqoli 
are closely related: both are Eastern Iranian languages. Still, there are significant 
differences in their sound systems and grammars. But Tajik (Tadzhik) belongs to the 
West Iranian languages and is quite different from both Wakhi and Sariqoli.17 As the 
language of education and administration in neighboring Tajikistan, Tajik has 
become the ‘flagship language’ for Pamir-Iranian speakers. In Tajikistan, dominant 
Tajik is used as a common language between speakers of different Pamir languages. 
However, Tajik is not spoken in China. 
                                                 
15This concept of projecting the twentieth-century concept of ‘Nationality’ backwards in time comes 
from discussions with Jonathan Lipman in 1994. 
16Re: Indo-European, see Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes [tr. Naomi Walford] (N.J.: Rutgers, 
1970), p. 96; re: Mongolic and Turkic, see Mirsultan Osmanov, Hazirqi zaman Uygur tilining di’alektliri 
(Ürümchi: Xinjiang Education Press, 1990), pp. 98-115. 
17 Bernard Comrie, The Languages of the Soviet Union (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 
161. 
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In the Concise Grammar of Tajik (sic), the author neatly sidesteps this problem with 
brain-bending logic. The bulk of the book is devoted to a grammar of “Tajik”, but 
the final chapter on “Tajik dialects” (added twenty years after the original draft 
grammar) informs us that “Wakhi (Wahan) and Sariqoli (Salikuer) are the main 
dialects of Tajik in China”. Furthermore, “Wakhi colloquial speech is used among 
Tajik Wakhis in China”.18 
 
Why the insistence, then, on “Tajik”? It is certainly more expedient than recognizing 
two separate groups. But why not call the Iranian-speaking peoples in China 
“Wakhis”? “Tajik”, apparently, is more ethnically and geographically neutral — since 
neither the Wakhi nor the Sariqoli are Tajik — and Tajik is a standard language with 
an orthography. 
 
This lumping together of ethnolinguistically distinct groups under a neutral 
ethnonym is common on the Chinese periphery, from the “Gaoshan” on Taiwan 
(which include at least seven mutually unintelligible ethnolinguistic groups) to the 
“Uygur” of the Tarim Basin (which include Turkic-Iranian and Turkic-Mongolic 
mixed languages). The Austronesian groups remaining on Taiwan identify 
themselves along ethnolinguistic lines (Paiwan, Atayal, Ami); the sedentary Turkic-
speakers of Xinjiang identify themselves by region: Turpanlïq (Turfani), Qäshqärlik 
(Kashgari). The labels ‘Gaoshan’ (Ch. high-mountain) and ‘Uygur’ (a medieval 
Eastern-Turkic ethnonym revived only in the 20th century) encourage member of 
these groups to see themselves as more or less homogeneous. Interestingly, at least 
in the case of ‘Uygur’ and ‘Gaoshan’, the etymology of the imposed ethnonym fills a 
different conceptual niche than the native ethnonym: the imposed Gaoshan is a 
geographical label; their self-appellations are ethnolinguistic. In contrast, the Uygurs 
identify themselves primarily on a geographic basis, whereas the imposed ethnonym 
is quasi-ethnolinguistic. 
 
(2) “KIRGIZ” (KEERKEZI) 
 
The modern Qïrghïz (Kyrgyz) are referred to as Keerkezi, but the eponymous people 
of Kyrgyzstan (Qïrghïzstan) and their medieval-to-premodern ancestors the two 
groups share are referred to as Jierjisi.19 Although Jierjisi has some historical 
precedent,20 its use with modern Qïrghïz of Kyrgyzstan suggests that the Central 
                                                 
18 Gao Erxie, Tajikeyu jianzhi (Beijing: Minzu, 1985), p. 101. 
19 E.g. Chen Yanqi and Sa Sha (eds), Xiyu yanjiu shumu (Ürümchi: Xinjiang renmin, 1990), p. 307. 
20Xiajiasi was used during the Tang dynasty to refer to the former Qïrghïz, following a Tang dynasty 
transcription form. See for example Chen and Sa, p. 92. 
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Nationalities Commission hopes to de-link or at least subtly weaken the connection 
the Xinjiang Qïrghïz have with their fellow Qïrghïz across the border.21 
 
(3) “EASTERN YUGUR” (DONGBU YUGUZU, SHERA YOGUR) 
 “WESTERN YUGUR” XIBU YUGUZU (SARÏG YOGUR) 
 
The people now known as the Yugurs of Gansu include two different groups, one 
Mongolic (Shera Yogur) and one Turkic (Sarïg Yogur). Both “native” ethnonyms 
mean “Yellow Yog(h)ur”. ‘Eastern Yugur’ and ‘Western Yugur’ are designations by 
the Chinese state. These groups fit none of the Stalinist criteria for status as one 
nationality: they share neither language, economy, “culture” (beyond both being 
Buddhist), nor ancestry. They just happen to be located in the same part of Gansu, 
and have come to share certain linguistic features as part of the Chinese-Turkic-
Mongolic-Tibetan melting pot there. “Only in the past forty years have [both the 
Mongol and Turkic Yugurs] started to identify themselves as Yugu as opposites to 
other groups in the region.” These people “cannot be defined as Tibetans because of 
language, and not as Mongols because the other groups of Mongol peoples are 
latecomers in the area”.22 
 
Sitting in our armchairs in Beijing, we read in The Minority Nationalities of China that 
“the Yugur nationality has two languages from different language families”.23 
Turning the book (or its logic) upside down, we might instead conclude that two 
different ethno-linguistic complexes have been grouped together into one 
nationality. 
 
 
4.6 METING OUT OFFICIAL ORTHOGRAPHIES 
 
In theory, since 1949 minority groups have enjoyed government support for either:  
(1) maintaining an existing orthographic system (or reviving a historical one), or  
(2) establishing a pinyin-based Latin orthography for those languages without one. 
 
In practice, speakers of marginalized “minor” languages may have difficulties 
obtaining official approval of any written standard. For example, some Salars in 
                                                 
21 Personal names within and without China’s borders are also subject to disassociation through 
transliteration: “Ismail”, for example, is rendered as Simayi for Ismails within China, but as Yisimaier 
for those outside China. 
22Sabira Ståhlberg, ‘A Central Asian-Chinese Ethnic Melting Pot: The Case of the Gansu Corridor’ 
(ms., 1995), p. 13; cf. Ståhlberg, Der Gansu-Korridor: Barbarenland diesseits und jenseits der Großen Chinesischen 
Mauer (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 1996). 
23 Zhongguo shaoshu minzu, p. 586. 
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Qinghai proposed a Latin-based orthography in 198324. This was rejected twice by 
the government (Han Jianye 1992, pers. comm.). Complicating matters was that Salar 
elders did not want a Latin-based orthography; because of historical precedent and 
their religious beliefs, they preferred one based in the Arabic script. 
 
This conflict between lead to a stalemate: their requests for an Arabic-based script 
were turned down several times. This likely was related to the government’s fears of 
the development of pan-Turkic sentiment in western China as much as it had to do 
with the purportedly exorbitant cost of printing books in a Salar script. In the end, 
there is no script, Arabic- or Latin-based, and it is a dead issue. 
 
At the other extreme, establishing multiple orthographies for one minzu leads to 
fragmentation: the Yi, for example, now have 3 standards: Northern, Guizhou, and 
Yunnan.25 
 
 
4.7 MARGINALIZING UNRECOGNIZED GROUPS 
 
To their credit, in the last decade researchers in China have begun to recognize a few 
mixed languages and study contact-induced language change. However, such 
research occurs within the same minority-language parameters outlined above. Those 
languages and their speakers who do not easily fit existing categories tend to be 
overlooked or marginalized. Q-S. Zhou mentions that during the 1980’s two “creoles 
or mixed languages” were “discovered” in Northwestern China: Äynu (Tarim basin, 
Xinjiang) and Wutun (southern Gansu).26 It is laudable that such information is 
being published in an international forum. But he continues: “A few hundred years 
ago the ancestors of the Äynu moved into Xinjiang from Iran and lived in compact 
villages scattered in the Uygur community” (ibid.). Unfortunately, a few hundred 
years ago, the sedentary Turkic-speaking Tarim basin denizens did not refer to 
themselves as Uygur, did not see themselves as a community beyond their own 
oases, and did not call their land Xinjiang. Furthermore, historical records are too 
unclear to state definitively that the Äynus originated in “Iran”. Although the Äynus 
are an Iranic-speaking people, it is well-known that Indo-Iranic speakers predated 
Turkic speakers in the Tarim basin. So it could well have been the “Uygurs” (i.e., 
                                                 
24 Xunhua Sala zizhixian, Qinghai minzu xueyuan minzu yanjiusuo yuwen yanjiushi, eds. 1983. Sala 
wenzi fang’an (draft). ms.  Created in consultation with the Xinjiang Language and Script Work 
Committee, the proposed standard was identical to Latin-script Uygur and Qazaq (with the 
inexplicable addition of an ‘N’ with a tail (N, n,) for the velar nasal [ng]). 
25 David Bradley, ‘Language Policy for the Yi’ (Paper presented at the Yi Studies Conference, 
University of Washington, 1995), p.8. 
26 Zhou Qingsheng, p.63. 
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Turkic peoples) that moved into “Xinjiang”. At the very least, modern 
ethnolinguistic paradigms are best confined to the present. 
 
In addition to projecting modern paradigms backwards onto the murky past, one 
other method of marginalizing problem languages and their speakers is to overlook 
their mixed status entirely. This is the favored technique with mixed languages that 
are already officially recognized and thus canonized as pure, monolithic entities. 
Baonan, Salar, and even surprisingly Northwestern Chinese come to mind. All three 
groups have been in sustained and heavy contact with speakers of Mongolic, Turkic, 
Tibetan, and Chinese languages. Although Baonan is Mongolic and Salar is Turkic in 
origin, high percentages of their vocabulary (30-40%) consists of Chinese and 
Tibetan words. Both have borrowed the Chinese copula shì and a host of other 
syntactic paradigms. Northwestern Chinese, a variety of Mandarin, has lost one of its 
tones and reversed its word order under Turkic and Mongolic influence.27 Baonan, 
Salar, and Northwestern Chinese fit the criteria for mixed or creolized languages, but 
are not recognized as such. To do so would contradict the notion that minorities and 
minority languages are discrete entities. 
 
4.8 “BILINGUAL” EDUCATION 
 
Another arm of minority-language policy has been so-called bilingual education. 
“Bilingual education” has a much more specific meaning than merely ‘education in 
two languages’ as the term seems to imply. As in the U.S., “bilingual education” 
really refers transitional schooling in the native language(s) while students master to 
the dominant language. 
 
From 1950 to 1978, Chinese schools offered sink-or-swim immersion in Standard 
Chinese from day one for minorities in elementary schools. This is still 
euphemistically referred to as ‘direct transition’28 or as ‘the expedient model’.29 A 
Salar academic researcher, now 37 with a college degree, had this to say from his 
experience of this pedagogical technique: “I did not speak a word in the classroom 
for the first four years. Then I finally started speaking Chinese, but my sentences came 
                                                 
27 Mantarô Hashimoto advanced quite convincing evidence that Northwestern Chinese is a creole 
language (Hashimoto Mantaro, ‘The Altaicization of Northern Chinese’ in J. McCoy and Timothy 
Light (eds.), Festschrift for Professor Nicholas Bodman  (1984)). Language-contact data on Baonan (Bao’an) 
is from Charles N. Li, ‘Languages in contact in Western China’ Papers in East Asian Languages v1 
(1983), pp. 21-51; that on Salar is from my own fieldwork. 
28 White, p. 55. 
29 Zhou Yaowen, ‘Bilingualism and bilingual education in China’ International Journal of the Sociology of 
Language 97 (1992), pp. 37-45. 
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out all backwards. It wasn’t until middle school that I was able to function in 
Chinese”.30 
 
Since 1978, bilingual education for minorities has been policy but more incrementally 
implemented in different areas. There are many methods,31 but the overall goal 
remains the same: to introduce Chinese at some point, and gradually achieve the 
transition from the speakers’ native language to Chinese. 
 
 
4.9 DRY GRAMMAR BOOKS IN SERVICE OF THE CHINESE STATE! 
 
Mandarin Chinese is considered the default language, or the sun around which 
minority-language planets orbit. Even grammar books are pressed into service for 
linguistically (and culturally) sinicizing minority education. So linguists are kept busy 
turning out endless contrastive grammars of Minority Language x vs. Standard 
Chinese. The stated aim is to help minority students learn Chinese more quickly. So, 
for example, the grammar will mention the difficulty Turkic speakers have with the 
Chinese retroflexes ² ´ ´\. Unfortunately they rarely provide concrete examples of 
language errors to enliven their wooden prose. So here’s one: Chinese Shanghai 
[²a¥51xai312], Qazaq [µ\a¥q\ai].32  
 
The writing of comparative grammars (of languages within a family) is strongly 
discouraged, particularly in a transnational language family. The rationale, of course, 
is that comparative grammars stimulate horizontal links between ethnic identities and 
thus seriously challenge the Chinese state. Comparisons between languages, if 
unavoidable, must be done between languages spoken in China. Data may not be 
drawn from speakers of these languages in other countries. So the Concise Grammar of 
Miao makes no mention of the relationship of “Miao” in China to the Hmong in 
Southeast Asia; similarly, from the Comparative Dictionary of the Chinese Turkic Languages 
(Minzu, 1990), one would gather that languages such as Özbek (Uzbek), Qazaq, and 
Qïrghïz are spoken nowhere else but in China.  
 
One striking illustration of the bounds of comparativist permissibility is the recent 
(1992) Central Minorities College textbook, An Introduction to the Turkic Languages 
(Tujueyu gailun). The editor Li Zengxiang presents most of the information himself, 
including a lengthy introduction to the history of the Turkic peoples and their 
languages, the phonology of modern Turkic languages, and a survey of research on 
these languages. The entire chapter on the classification of the Turkic languages, 
                                                 
30 Musa Abdu 1992, personal communication. 
31 Zhou Yaowen, pp. 40-41, Zhou Qingsheng, pp. 60-61, White, pp. 55-56. 
32 I am indebted to Ahmetjan Qaybaruli for sharing moments of his childhood hilarity with me. 
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however, is translated entirely from the works of well-known non-Chinese (mostly 
Russian) Turcologists on the subject. 
 
The mid-book switch of authors is striking, and reflects the more subtle constraints 
on acceptable topics in linguistics. Classification is off-limits because it is a political 
minefield: proposing a new linguistic grouping could easily upset a delicate ethnic 
balance somewhere in China. If Uygur and Özbek were shown to be more closely 
related than Shanghai and Cantonese Chinese, the Uygurs might start to get fancy 
ideas of Pan-Turkism. Conversely, if two Tibetan dialects were proposed to be 
separate languages but all speakers self-identified as Tibetan, these speakers might 
accuse the State linguists of divide-and-conquer tactics.  
 
Part of the function of linguists and linguistic scholarship in China is to stabilize the 
perception of languages and linguistic/cultural groups. In this capacity, transnational 
linguistic or cultural comparison is strictly frowned upon. 
 
In the Turkology textbook, one could argue that Li, in presenting foreign scholarship 
on linguistic classification, was simply deferring to the highest authorities on the 
subject. If this were true it would be highly uncharacteristic of Chinese scholarship: 
ever since the invention of gunpowder (or at least since the founding of the P.R.C.), 
relevant theories are incorporated into Chinese scholarship and reborn as “Chinese 
theories”, usually without a whisper of attribution.33 But in the Turkology book, the 
foreign author’s names constitute section titles and are very prominent.  
 
One final word on the framing of the Turkic peoples: when referring to “Turkic” 
(Tujue) in association with “ethnic group” (minzu), the grapheme “language” (yu) is 
always inserted between the two: “Turkic-speaking peoples” (Tujueyu minzu) instead 
of “Turkic peoples” (Tujue minzu). “Turkic peoples” clearly identifies the ethnicity 
of these people as “Turks”, implying that the seven Turkic groups now within 
China’s borders are really one people. Far safer is the label “Turkic-speaking people”, 
which is linguistically specific but ethnically generic, and thus allows for the 
application of a Chinese state-approved label: Uygur, Qazaq, Yugur, Salar, Tuva, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 To give but one example: in one 1992 article published in an international journal (Zhou Qingsheng, 
p. 62), a Chinese author defines and distinguishes types of code-switching , attributing the theory to a 
short 1988 article by an author in Guizhou, yet never mentioning the enormous body of work on the 
topic which preceded him, such as Gumperz 1982 and Ferguson 1972. 
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5. The Chinese Languages 
 
5.1 THE UNIFYING MYTH OF “THE HAN LANGUAGE” (HANYU)  
 
Today in the P.R.C., the generic term for spoken and written Chinese is Hanyu, the 
“language of the Hans.” It refers increasingly (especially in academic writing) to the 
Standard language, but can also refer to all Chinese languages (“dialects”). 
Interestingly, this term has been gaining ground over the formerly widespread 
Putonghua “the common language.” The utilitarian, socialist-flavored label Putonghua 
connotes an ideal common language spoken across China by ordinary folks. The 
more recent preference for Hanyu reflects a shift towards language identification 
along clearly ethnic lines. Before, the distinction was [±proletarian]; now the 
important distinction is [±Han]. Even after achieving the socialist revolution, the 
Chinese state has found its peripheral peoples still restless. 
 
The term Hanyu is used with particular frequency to describe earlier stages of 
Chinese, e.g. Gudai Hanyu (“Old Chinese”). These include all the modern Chinese 
dialects. These historical dialects are referred to as one ancient Han entity going back 
5000 years to the dawn of Han Chinese civilization. This again reflects the 
homogenizing and backwards-projecting agenda of the modern Chinese state in its 
constant drive to legitimize its power. Except for its use as a label of two historical 
dynasties and their people, the term “Han” was not associated with a pan-Chinese 
language until quite recently. The distinction and standardization of an official, 
hegemonic language (initially Guoyu “National Language,” later Putonghua) did not 
occur until early in this century.34 
 
 
5.2 ACCORDING MINORITY-LANGUAGE-LIKE STATUS TO CHINESE “DIALECTS”  
 
Chinese as spoken across China was hardly uniform or unified. But by grouping 
these languages as though there were one, the state demoted the status of these 
languages to mere “non-standard dialects”, thus strengthening the authority of the 
Mandarin-speaking center. 
 
Except for Mandarin, speakers of the six other modern Chinese “dialects groups”, 
the Min, Yue, Wu, Gan, Xiang, and Hakka (Kejia), are found in central and southern 
China. Despite being called “Chinese dialects” nationally and internationally, they are 
largely mutually unintelligible. The dialect names correspond to historical regions 
                                                 
34 Jerry Norman, Chinese (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 133. 
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(which were often statelets) of eastern and southern China.35 These groups lived 
among and likely even included speakers of Austroasiatic languages, as well as 
Chinese speakers. In earliest times, linguistic and archaeological evidence suggests 
that the region was highly multilingual and multicultural. Toponyms in southeastern 
China today provide strong evidence that Austroasiatic people lived in that area very 
early on. There is even linguistic evidence that convincingly suggests that the 
historical Yue (now “Cantonese” speakers) actually spoke Austroasiatic languages.36 
 
Policy mandates that schooling be conducted nationally in Putonghua so that 
speakers of non-standard Chinese dialects can be brought up to speed on the 
national standard language, Mandarin. All schooling in Chinese is expected to be 
conducted in Putonghua. From the point of view of language attitudes, however, 
there are two types of non-standard Chinese: higher-prestige and low-prestige 
“dialects”. In this way it is much like the minority-language dominance scale: there is 
the dominant Standard Language (Mandarin), and then all the other dialects in a 
subordinate (“primary minority”) position. Non-standard Chinese “dialects” are 
lower prestige than Mandarin and do not enjoy nearly the infrastructural support in 
education, administration, and the media. In many ways, speakers of non-standard 
Chinese dialects are worse off than their minority counterparts: “major minorities” 
(e.g. the Uygurs) have access to limited schooling, radio and television, and even 
governmental affairs in their own language. Not so for their Min and Yue Chinese 
comrades. Yet while external pressure to use Mandarin is strong, speakers of these 
“dialects” often strongly identify themselves with their language and locale. There is 
a definite insider’s pride in being a Shanghainese, or a Min speaker in Fujian. 
 
 
5.3 QINGPUHUA: STANDARDS WITHIN STANDARDS 
 
An audio tape of Qinghai Chinese xiangsheng (stand-up comedy, sometimes called 
“Cross-talk”37) is a delightful example of how conscious people are about language 
standards. On this tape, produced in Xining, one of the duo acts the part of a native 
speaker of Qinghai Chinese, while the other pretends he is a visitor from the nation’s 
capital. The visitor is a know-it-all who looks down on the locals yet claims he has no 
trouble understanding their every word. His opposite decides to test his listening 
comprehension. He utters a great stream of words with sibilants. In Standard 
Chinese, this speech would contain clear distinctions between retroflex and palatal 
sounds. But since these are not distinguished in Qinghai Chinese, the stream of 
                                                 
35 Except for ‘Hakka’ ‘guest’, a label by Yue speakers given to the non-Yue “barbarians” who had 
moved in among them. 
36 Norman, p. 18. 
37 Su Falin and Peng Honghe, Qinghai fangyan xiangsheng. (Xining: Kunlun Recordings, 1989). [audio 
cassette]. 
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speech just sound like the buzzing of an angry bumblebee. Of course, the arrogant 
visitor fails miserably. 
 
The humorous tension between supercilious standard-language speakers and 
babbling locals reveals the gulf of prestige between the two varieties of Chinese. 
Such language attitudes have fostered the development of an intermediary variety of 
Chinese in Qinghai. It is a compromise, non-standard standard Chinese which 
partially incorporates the sound system and vocabulary of the Qinghai vernacular 
(tuhua) into Standard Chinese. It is an local adaptation of Standard Mandarin Chinese 
that enjoys quasi-official sanction in the local broadcast media and state enterprises 
(including educational institutions), which refer to it as “Qing(hai) Pu(tong)hua”, 
“Qinghai’s Common Language”. In other Mandarin-speaking areas, other regional 
standard varieties have developed which emulate Standard Mandarin. But Qingpuhua 
not only emulates Standard Mandarin, it also represents it. Qingpuhua is not merely a 
linguistic bridge between the dominant standard and local varieties. The fact that 
locals have given it a name suggests that it has become a metalanguage: it is at once a 
functioning lingua franca, and a statement about language itself. The existence of 
Qingpuhua constitutes a statement about the local identity and the limits of central 
government control. 
 
 
6. China from Within and Without: The Effects of Adhering to a Single Text 
 
The Chinese state cannot encourage real autonomy and multiple ethnolinguistic 
identities outside of the overarching zhonghua minzu — for Hans or “minorities” — 
because these horizontal entities threaten the vertical basis of power. Plural identities 
and autonomy are strongly decentralizing forces. In the last fifteen years, the 
entrepreneurial boom (“socialism with Chinese characteristics”, a.k.a. euphemistic 
capitalism) and massive demographic shifts of an increasingly mobile population has 
been challenging the homogenizing efforts of the Chinese nation-state. I met Uygurs 
and Hans from Xinjiang who had moved to Shenzhen, and Huis and Salars who had 
taken teaching jobs in Hainan. Such increased demographic mobility, however, has 
not thusfar resulted in a greater acceptance of multiple identities in society. Both the 
dominant group and minorities themselves reinforce negative stereotypes of 
minorities and non-prestige Hans. Thus a Chinese-educated Qazaq intellectual from 
Gansu told me, “Whenever I go to Beijing I feel like such a hick”. As the east-coast 
cities are flooded with skilled and unskilled fortune-seekers, intra-Han conflicts are 
emerging as well. Han speakers moving to Beijing from Xinjiang are teased for their 
drawl (“hao de heeeen! [Great!]”) and “toneless Chinese”, even though both groups 
speak “the same dialect” natively.  
 This illustrates the interaction of language, speaker perceptions, and the 
Chinese state. I have shown the codifying and textualizing pressure exerted by the 
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Chinese state on its minority languages. I have proposed a re-examination of 
assumptions about the purportedly static texture of language in a multilingual society, 
and a re-examination of the paradigm of central control. 
 
This is not merely a campaign for the maintenance and encouragement of linguistic 
and ethnic diversity in China. The purpose here has also been to demonstrate the 
misinformation generated when the minority-language paradigm of the Chinese state 
is propagated unwittingly by researchers overseas.  
 
Many people, even specialists, unquestioningly accepting the backwards projection of 
history and the use of Chinese ethnonymic labels. For example, in a recent Chinggis 
Khan exhibit38, the forebearers of the Mongols were described as “the Eastern Hu” 
even though hu never was an ethnic group, but just meant any ‘barbarians to the 
north and west of China proper.” Another example is the widely-read English-
language reference work, The Languages of China. It states that: “The Uigurs and their 
close relatives, the Yellow Uigurs [=Sarïg Yogur=Western Yugur] and the Salar are 
found almost exclusively within Chinese borders. They are both in name and in fact 
indigenous peoples of China”.39 
 
The degree of certainty with which his assertions are made is misleading. Much is still 
unknown about the history of these peoples and their languages. But it is clear that 
when the Turkic-speaking ancestors of the modern Uygurs settled in the area, it was 
not “China” as we know it today.40 The Uygurs (and Sarïg Yogurs) may be 
indigenous to the region, but they are not indigenous “to China”. 
 
Languages are highly textured things, compact masses of cultural knowledge. 
Languages and their speakers in China have been codified and hierarchically ordered 
in the constant drive for legitimization of the Chinese state. 
 
                                                 
38 Chinggis Khan exhibit, Royal British Columbia Museum, Victoria, B.C. and L.A. County Museum 
of Art, 1995. 
39 S. Robert Ramsey, The Languages of China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 185, 
emphasis added. 
40The Salars are most likely indigenous to Transoxiana south of Samarkand, not China. There is 
linguistic and historical evidence that the Sarïgh Yogurs are not Uygurs at all, but may be Siberian 
Turks historically (Geng Shimin and Larry Clark, ‘Sarig Yugur Materials’ Acta Orientalia Academiae 
Scientaiarum Hung. 46 n2-3 (1992), p. 193). The Uygurs and Sarïgh Yogurs can only be considered 
indigenous to China if the modern political boundaries of the People’s Republic are imagined 
backwards in time. While the Hans have a long history of contacts with the Uygurs (and Sarïgh Yogur) 
and had settlements in Turkistan, Chinese control of the Tarim and Junggarian basins waxed and 
waned over time with the rise and fall of oasis-states and Chinese dynasties. China laid claim to the 
Eastern Turkistan frontier region in 1784, but the region was not firmly in Chinese control until the 
establishment of the P.R.C. 
